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ABSTRACT 
This technical report summarizes research that has produced an optimization-based 
decision support system for assessing the resilience of the Marine Transport System 
conveying coal in the Port of Pittsburgh area.  We describe waterside data with the 
throughput and storage capacities of locks, pools, and transfer points; landside data with 
road and rail capacities; a set of coal contracts (i.e., grade of coal, source, destination, 
quantity, and delivery date); and some policy costs for using these alternate conveyances, 
and perhaps suffering some shortage.  An “operator’s model” is presented that uses this 
data to emulate the best cost-minimizing policy to operate this Marine Transport System.  
This operator’s model is then manipulated to emulate loss of key components and 
evaluate the best possible system response, where it may be necessary to transfer from 
the least-expensive, waterborne barge conveyance to rail and/or road transport, and it 
may be necessary to allocate shortages among system customers.  Systematic evaluations 
lead to a “resilience curve” for the system.  Generalizing, simultaneous loss of sets of 
components can be modeled, as can the effects of defending certain components, 
rendering them invulnerable to attack.  The final product, a Defender-Attacker-Defender 
optimization system, can advise the best use of a given defensive budget, where an 
attacker will observe these defensive preparations and alter his plans accordingly, and the 
operator, observing losses due to attacks, responds as best able to operate the surviving 
infrastructure.  This system can be applied without change to any other Marine Transport 
System conveying any set of commodities as flows through a transport network, although 
considerable effort may be required to develop the appropriate input data and then run the 
model to perform the analysis. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This technical report summarizes research that has produced an  
optimization-based decision support system for assessing the resilience of the Marine 
Transport System conveying coal in the Port of Pittsburgh area.  This is the latest in a 
long sequence of such contributions by the authors to other infrastructure systems, 
including water, oil and gas pipelines, highway networks, electric grids, 
telecommunications networks, social networks, etc.; a total of nearly 150 such 
applications to date. 
The centerpiece of this work is an “operator’s model” that emulates how this 
Marine Transport System can best be operated given the condition of each of its 
components.  We describe waterside barge components, with the throughput and storage 
capacities of locks, pools, and transfer points, and landside road and rail capacities; a set 
of coal contracts (i.e., grade of coal, source, destination, quantity, and delivery date); and 
some policy costs for using these alternate conveyances and perhaps suffering  
some shortage. 
The operator’s model uses this data to emulate the feasible interactions of all 
components that satisfy physical limitations, while incurring minimal total system costs.  
Once we are convinced the operator’s model faithfully represents how the  
Marine Transport System can be used, it is easy to conduct “what-if” analysis that inflicts 
hypothetical damage on components and then observes the best possible response to 
operate the surviving components. 
Next, an “attacker model” is posed that represents how a hypothetical, intelligent 
adversary would apply limited resources to optimally choose components to attack, 
knowing that the operator will respond as best possible.  The attacker chooses the best 
worst-case attacks he can afford, and our operator responds by resorting to alternate 
means of conveyance, likely at increased cost.  We can use the attacker model to evaluate 
the “return on investment” that an attacker receives from increased attack effort. 
We argue that the attacker and operator models provide a natural means to trace 
out the “resilience curve” of this regional part of the Marine Transport System. 
  xvi 
Finally, we add a third level to advise where to make investments to harden, 
defend, or otherwise render components more resistant to, or invulnerable to attack.  The 
final product, a “defender-attacker-defender” optimization system, can advise the best use 
of a given defensive budget, where an attacker will observe these defensive preparations 
and alter his plans accordingly, and the operator, observing losses due to attacks, 
responds as best able to operate the surviving infrastructure. 
This system can be used to plan over an extended time horizon and account for 
estimated reconstitution times of damaged components, which may vary from days for 
road and rail, to weeks or months for bridges, locks, and, especially, dams.  For example, 
this defender-attacker-defender decision support model can advise how to preposition 
assets and products in anticipation of a scheduled interruption of component availability, 
say for maintenance or new construction. 
The U.S. Coast Guard already tends systems that collect information about 
infrastructure components of the Marine Transport System.  These are ideal to use in 
support of the defender-attacker-defender decision support system we describe.  Much of 
the required data is already collected.  What is missing, and essential, is the interaction 
between components—how they behave as a system. 
These defender-attacker-defender decision support models do not require 
probabilistic risk assessment of any attacker intent, nor do we require any probabilistic 
assessment of vulnerability to attack.  Following standard military planning doctrine, we 
plan based on attacker capabilities, not intent.  We note that the only situation where 
military planners might assess attacker intent is when the time horizon is very short and 
intelligence is very strong.  This is a rare situation that we cannot rely on for continued, 
routine planning to defend our infrastructure.  Further, even if we do assess these 
probabilities of intent and vulnerability, they are obviously not independent, as is 
customarily assumed (i.e., an attacker would surely change his probability in response to 
any change in vulnerability).  We avoid these complications, and the requirement that 
such probabilities be stated for some fixed time epoch. 
This system can be applied without change to any other Marine Transport System 
conveying any set of commodities that can realistically be represented by flows through a 
  xvii 
transportation network, although considerable effort may be required to develop the 
appropriate input data and then run the model to perform the analysis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Marine Transportation System (MTS) of the United States consists of 
“waterways, ports, and intermodal landside connections that allow various modes of 
transportation to move people and goods to, from, and on the water” (U.S. Department of 
Transportation [USDOT], 2012).  As noted in United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
Publication 3-0 (2012b, p. 9): 
“The United States claims sovereignty over 3.4 million nautical square 
miles of maritime territory, which comprises the MTS.  The MTS includes 95,000 
miles of coastline and 361 ports, from the largest mega-ports to the smallest 
fishing harbors and marinas.  The MTS also includes the system of interconnected 
inland rivers and the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW), which consists of 12,000 
miles of navigable waters connecting inland metropolitan areas, industrial 
complexes, and the agricultural heartland of the country.  The MTS includes the 
Great Lakes, along 6,700 miles of U.S. coastline and 1,500 miles of international 
maritime border with Canada, that connect the industrial north and northern 
population centers of the Midwest through the St. Lawrence Seaway System to 
the Atlantic Ocean.” 
 
U.S. interests additionally extend much farther to islands such as Hawaii, Puerto Rico, 
and Guam.  (For background on the size and scope of the MTS, see also Chapter 3 of 
Rodrigue et al., 2009, or Transportation Research Board, 2012.) 
The MTS is vital to the economic welfare of the United States.  Consider the 
following statistics (quoted directly from U.S. Department of Transportation, 2012): 
• Waterborne cargo and associated activities contribute more than  
$649 billion annually to the U.S. GDP, sustaining more than 13 million 
jobs. 
• MTS activities contribute over $212 billion in annual federal, state, and 
local taxes. 
• Over 45 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent container units) and  
1.5 billion tons of foreign traffic were handled in 2006, with a value of 
nearly $1.3 trillion dollars. 
• Approximately 99% of the volume of overseas trade (62% by value) 
enters or leaves the U.S. by ship. 
A prolonged disruption to MTS operations has the potential to cause significant economic 
consequences. 
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The USCG has responsibility for protecting the MTS through its Ports, 
Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission. 
“The PWCS mission entails the protection of the U.S. Maritime Domain and the 
U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) and those who live, work or recreate 
near them; the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, 
or subversive acts; and response to and recovery from those that do occur.  
Conducting PWCS deters terrorists from using or exploiting the MTS as a means 
for attacks on U.S. territory, population centers, vessels, critical infrastructure, 
and key resources.  PWCS includes the employment of awareness activities; 
counterterrorism, antiterrorism, preparedness and response operations; and the 
establishment and oversight of a maritime security regime.  PWCS also includes 
the national defense role of protecting military outload operations” (USCG 
2012c). 
 
PWCS is only one of 11 missions assigned to the USCG (see Engel 2011 for a complete 
list and discussion).  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), however, has stated 
that the highest priority for the USCG is preventing terrorism and enhancing security 
(USCG 2012h). 
The USCG faces several challenges in executing its PWCS mission. 
• There are many potential sources of disruption to the MTS.  These include 
both nondeliberate hazards (e.g., weather events, natural disasters, 
accidents, and failures) and deliberate threats (e.g., terrorism, sabotage, 
vandalism, and crime). 
• The Coast Guard has a geographically vast and complex operational 
area.  The Coast Guard operates in the maritime domain.  The physical 
characteristics of the sea present varying, dynamic and dangerous weather, 
seas states and water conditions.  The maritime industry continues to 
evolve as the world remains fully dependent on global maritime trade in 
an advancing technology and information age.  Varied and overlapping 
international and sovereign legal and policy regimes governing the 
maritime domain pose practical operational challenges (USCG 2012b). 
• The Coast Guard has limited resources.  In 2011, the Coast Guard 
consisted of approximately 43,000 active duty members (USCG 2012g) 
and had an operating budget of $10.5 billion (USCG 2012a Posture 
Statement).  That same year, the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) had approximately 34,000 uniformed officers (NYPD 2011). 
As a result, the Coast Guard needs to make judicious use of its resources in order to 
succeed in the PWCS mission and its other mission areas.  As noted by Commandant 
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Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., (USCG 2011a), a key question is how to prioritize activities 
and the use of limited resources across this diverse set of activities. 
A. RISK-BASED PRIORITIZATION 
Risks to the MTS threaten lives, economic stability, and national security.  As 
defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon (DHS 2010, p. 27), risk is “potential for an unwanted 
outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood 
and the associated consequences.” 
Risk is a key organizing principle in Coast Guard strategies, programs, and 
activities.  All Coast Guard risk models are linked, with primary governance of  
risk-related efforts being managed by the Coast Guard’s Enterprise Strategy, 
Management, and Doctrine Oversight Directorate (CG-095).  Coast Guard risk 
assessments, and the tools that guide those assessments, span the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels of the Coast Guard. 
This section briefly describes these tools and how they are used. 
At the strategic level, the National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment 
(NMSRA) is an all-mission risk assessment that informs budget and planning guidance.  
The NMSRA is a biennial, broad, horizontal assessment across the Coast Guard’s 
enduring roles of safety, security, and stewardship, and is inclusive of all Coast Guard 
mission programs.  The assessment produces three main products:  a residual risk profile, 
a USCG risk reduction profile, and key observations (USCG 2012f).  The residual risk 
profile estimates the expected societal loss that remains after the USCG has performed all 
of its prevention and response activities.  The USCG measures societal loss in the context 
of each specific mission.  For example, in the case of the USCG’s Search and Rescue 
mission, societal loss is measured in lives lost in maritime distress.  The USCG risk 
reduction profile estimates the amount of risk that is avoided due to the USCG’s response 
activities.  Finally, the NMSRA offers key observations including risk drivers and risk 
management opportunities. 
The NMSRA is built around the Consequence Equivalency Matrix (CEM), which 
maps different levels of consequence from different types of impacts onto a common 
value scale.  In the CEM, rows correspond to different risk-related, impact categories 
  4 
such as “Death & Injury” and “Direct Economic Loss” (see Figure 1), and columns 
correspond to consequence levels ranging from 0 to 9 that represent the severity of 
damage for each impact category (USCG 2012f). 
 
Figure 1. Excerpt from the Consequence Equivalency Matrix (USCG 2012f). 
The underlying idea of the CEM is that having a common value scale facilitates 
the comparison of risks from different types of impacts.  For example, the following three 
impacts map to the same column in the CEM:  (1) economic damage between $3 million 
and $29 million, (2) life-threatening injuries for 1-5 people, and (3) interruption of port 
commerce for one week. 
The USCG measures risk in terms of a basic unit known as a Risk Index Number 
(RIN) that “represents or provides equivalent pain thresholds for an expected annualized 
loss of $1 million dollars” (USCG 2012e, p. 3).  RINs are used as a common risk 
currency among all Coast Guard missions with measurable consequences.  The intent is 
to compare, for example, the risks of drug trafficking to those of terrorism, and then to 
direct resources to these efforts accordingly. 
The Operational Risk Assessment Model (ORAM) translates the high-level, 
strategic risk assessment in the NMSRA to the operational level (USCG LANT-7 2012d).  
The view of risk in ORAM is essentially the same as in the NMSRA, but it 
accommodates more frequent reassessments to examine how individual resource 
contributions are mitigating risk.  Using RINs as a common metric, ORAM assesses risk 
individually for the Coast Guard’s missions and also subdivides each mission into 
geographic regions.  ORAM supports the service’s decision making not only for  
short-fused, operational planning (e.g., the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response event in 
2011), but also in support of operational force apportionment planning. 
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Planning at the tactical level in the USCG uses color-coded risk score cards, 
called Green-Amber-Red, to assess benefits and risks before executing a specific mission.  
For example, Green-Amber-Red assessment is used every day at USCG small boat 
stations to determine risk in day-to-day activities.  The objectives of this type of 
operational risk management are to recognize the inherent risks during sortie execution 
and to assess the trade-offs associated with mitigating, transferring, or accepting  
those risks. 
Thus, RINs are used for long-term planning while Green-Amber-Red assessments 
are used for daily mission planning. 
1. Assessing Port Security Risk 
The Marine Transportation Security Act of 2002 mandates that vessels and ports 
conduct vulnerability assessments as part of local area maritime security plans (Maritime 
Transportation Security Act 2002).  The USCG Captain of the Port is the Federal 
Maritime Security Coordinator charged with coordination of the local Area Maritime 
Security Committee, who develops and implements those plans. 
In 2006, DHS established the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to 
protect the United States Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR). 
“The overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more 
resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects 
of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of 
our nation's CI/KR and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and 
rapid recovery of CI/KR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other 
emergency” (DHS 2009, p. 1). 
 
The NIPP provides guidance for all Department of Homeland Security (DHS) entities to 
analyze terrorism risk using assessments of Threat (T), Vulnerability (V), and 
Consequence (C).  In a so-called “TVC model,” a threat is typically characterized in 
terms of the probability that a specific target will be attacked (DHS 2009).  To account 
for uncertainties, this threat can be represented as a single-point estimate of probability 
(i.e., that an attack occurs) or with a probability distribution (Willis 2007).  Vulnerability 
is assessed as “the likelihood that an attack is successful, given that it is attempted” (DHS 
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2009, p. 33).  “Consequence is the magnitude and type of damage resulting from 
successful terrorist attacks” (Willis 2007, p. 599).  The overall risk in a TVC model 
represents an expected loss, typically measured in lives lost or dollars in damage.  Greater 
expected losses equate to higher risk values. 
With the NIPP as guidance, the Coast Guard developed the Maritime Security 
Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM) to serve as a terrorism risk management tool.  The intent 
of MSRAM is to give Coast Guard analysts across the country the ability to perform 
detailed risk analysis for potential terrorist targets in their areas of responsibility.  The 
results of these analyses support a variety of risk management decisions at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels.  MSRAM assesses risk-based scenarios that consist of a 
combination of target and attack mode, in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  
Threat is defined as the intent, capability, and presence of terrorists to deliver the attack 
on the class of target in location throughout the U.S. domain.  Vulnerability is the 
probability of a successful attack based of the following factors:  (1) innate difficulty of 
the attack, (2) ability of the owner-operator, other law enforcement and the USCG to 
intervene either collectively or independently, and (3) the ability of the target to 
withstand the attack.  Consequence is the negative impact of a successful attack on the 
United States in terms of:  deaths and/or injuries, environmental impacts, impacts to 
national security, symbolic impacts, and economic impact to the national GDP. 
The relative risk for the associated scenario(s) is expressed as the Risk Index 
Number or (RIN) which can be further categorized into five levels:  very low, low, 
medium, high, and very high.  MSRAM is embedded with a set of terrorism scenarios 
spanning the USCG’s PWCS mission, and it has the functionality to compare results of a 
risk assessment and rank scenarios. 
2. Concerns About the Use of Probabilities to Assess Terrorism Risk 
An important feature in TVC models of risk, as implemented in MSRAM, is that 
they assess the likelihood of both non-deliberate hazards and deliberate threats using 
static probabilities.  Understandably, there is a longstanding desire on the part of analysts 
and policy makers to assess the risk from “all hazards” in a single model.  As 
  7 
documented by Cox (2008) and the National Research Council (NRC 2008, 2010), 
however, there are problems with using TVC methods to do this. 
First, there is not enough historical data to assess the probability of a future 
terrorist attack, and it is questionable, in this context, whether past events are 
representative of future ones.  Relying on subjective assessment from subject matter 
experts to assess probabilities has inherent biases and simply cannot be validated against 
ground truth (see Brown and Cox 2011 and references therein).  Second, deliberate 
attacks from an adversary are distinctly different from non-deliberate events, such as 
accidents, failures, or natural disasters, and should be handled separately.  We represent 
acts of nature as random events, based on seasonal or climatic conditions, because 
historical data is readily available for characterizing these probabilities, and we can use 
science to validate these parameters.  We also collect data on technological failures and 
can perform laboratory “stress tests” to assess when and how system components fail; we 
characterize them using probabilistic measures such as hazard rates or mean time 
between failures.  Even human errors or mishaps can be characterized by probabilities. 
Once an intelligent adversary enters the scenario, however, the rules change (see 
Engel 2011 for a detailed discussion).  This adversary conducts thoughtful planning and 
observation of CI/KR, then makes a deliberate decision about whether, when, and how to 
attack.  The assumption that an adversary behaves randomly according to known 
probabilities cannot be validated and is simply not prudent. 
B. OPERATIONAL RESILIENCE 
There is an alternative to the risk-based assessment and prioritization currently 
promoted by DHS and used by USCG.  In its National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Homeland Security Council [HSC] 2007), the U.S. government recognizes that a 
traditional security focus on prevention will not be enough to keep systems like the  
MTS operational. 
“We will not be able to deter all terrorist threats, and it is impossible to deter or 
prevent natural catastrophes.  We can, however, mitigate the Nation’s 
vulnerability to acts of terrorism, other man-made threats, and natural disasters by 
ensuring the structural and operational resilience of our critical infrastructure and 
key resources . . . .  We must now focus on the resilience of the system as a 
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whole—an approach that centers on investments that make the system better able 
to absorb the impact of an event without losing the capacity to function” (HSC 
2007, pp. 27–28). 
 
The term “operational resilience” is of key importance here.  Infrastructure 
systems like the MTS are more than just an inventory list of assets.  The importance of an 
individual waterway, port, or intermodal landside connection comes from its contribution 
to the overall function of the system; in the case of the MTS, we can measure this 
function in terms of things like the ability to move cargo from point of origin to 
destination.  This interoperability is one of the reasons that the connection between 
coastal ports, Western Rivers, and littoral environments is important. 
Thus, we define operational resilience as the continued function of a system in the 
presence of disruptions (see Alderson et al., 2012, for background and discussion).  In the 
context of the PWCS mission, the objective of operational resilience is to deny 
consequences to the adversary; this leads to deterrence. 
There is a now a large literature on the application of system interdiction models 
to assess the impact of disruptions to the operation of infrastructure systems, some 
focusing explicitly on the MTS.  Brown et al. (2005, 2006) provide an introduction and 
review of the main concepts, which we briefly review here. 
System interdiction models use game theory to investigate the interactions of two 
opponents.  The first opponent, or player, is trying to ensure the operation of some 
system; we call this player the “operator” or the “defender.”  The second player is trying 
to interdict (syn. attack) that operation; we call this player the “attacker.”  In a system 
interdiction model, player behavior is sequential (i.e., players take turns) and the behavior 
of each player is modeled as an explicit decision, not a random event.  For this reason, 
system interdiction models are closely associated with Stackelberg games (von 
Stackelberg 1952). 
Development of a system interdiction model requires that (1) we focus on a 
specific system of interest and (2) we restrict attention to an unambiguous and mutually 
agreed on measure of performance.  Our modeling and analysis proceed in three  
basic steps. 
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First, we build a model that reflects the normal (e.g., Marine Security Level 1) 
operation of the system.  We take a systems perspective:  the overall system is comprised 
of individual components that work collectively to provide its function.  We identify a 
notional operator (also called the defender) who makes decisions about the activities in 
the system, and we measure system performance relative to some clearly stated objective.  
In practice, the operator can be an individual, a group of individuals, or a set of 
prescribed operating rules—the key point is that the operator reconciles, in an intelligent 
manner, what we would like the system to do with what it can actually do.  The operator 
uses available components as best he can to maximize the agreed on measure of 
performance.  We use this operator’s model as the basis for a variety of  
“what-if” analyses. 
The operator’s model is flexible enough to assess system performance following 
any loss of component functionality, for any number of damaged or destroyed 
components.  As such, the operator’s model mimics real-life system performance as best 
as can be done, and shows how the system operator would respond to maximize his 
measure of performance in the face of any disruption.  There are a number of 
infrastructure systems that use such models today, such as our electric generation and 
distribution grid, which independent system operators manage minute-by-minute with 
industry-standard models.  Other infrastructures, such as transport, distribution, and 
storage systems, operate on such basic physical principles, and we can easily model them. 
The damage to or loss of an individual component, or a set of them, affects what 
the operator can do, and it therefore has the potential to affect the performance of the 
system.  We refer to the change in optimal system performance that results from the 
worst-case loss of system components as the consequence associated with that loss.  
Assessing the consequence associated with the damage to or loss of a component means 
simply rerunning the operator’s model with the damaged components, and without the 
destroyed ones.  If any damaged component was used previously, then the operator may 
need to choose a different set of activities to best exploit the capabilities of his surviving 
infrastructure.  If that component was critical to system operation, then the resulting 
system performance will be degraded, even after the operator has wisely adjusted system 
  10 
activities.  Thus, the operator’s model allows us to investigate in a systematic way how 
the degradation or loss of one or more components affects the performance of the  
entire system. 
An important feature of many systems, particularly infrastructure systems, is that 
the loss of a component in one location can affect the operation of the system in an 
entirely different location; the geographic disparity often makes this non-intuitive and 
therefore hard to identify in advance.  Another important feature is that the consequence 
associated with the loss of multiple components in combination can be (much) greater 
than the sum of the consequences associated with the losses of these same individual 
components.  For example, imagine a railroad transportation system that uses two bridges 
in parallel to span a river.  It could be that the impact to moving trains across the river is 
impacted only slightly by the loss of either bridge (because the other serves as a backup), 
but the loss of both bridges is catastrophic.  Thus, it is important to assess the 
consequences from not only the loss of individual components, but also from 
combinations (sets) of components.  The potential number of scenarios to consider 
therefore depends on the total number of system components and their possible 
combinations, which can be very large, even for a system of modest size. 
In principle, it is possible to assess resilience by exhaustively enumerating the 
loss of every possible combination of components.  If it is not practical to consider all 
possible combinations (e.g., because this would take too long), then one must decide 
where to focus.  Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) techniques, including TVC models, 
focus on the “most likely” independent losses of individual system components, as 
specified by static probabilities.  As discussed, the justification for doing this depends 
entirely on the validity of the assessed individual probabilities, and on the independence 
of these probabilities between attack, damage, and components; such independence 
assumptions are dangerous in the case of an intelligent adversary. 
An alternate technique that avoids the pitfall of having to assess the probability of 
each scenario is to consider the “worst-case” combinations of system components.  Our 
notion of worst case derives from a hypothetical intelligent adversary, who we call the 
attacker, who targets combinations of components to harm the overall function of the 
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system in the worst possible way.  We assume that the attacker knows everything about 
the system and its operation, but that he has limited capability to attack and damage or 
destroy components.  We can measure the capability of the attacker in several ways, such 
as the number of components that he can simultaneously attack or the total budget of 
resources (e.g., individuals, money) available for the attack.  Our attacker is not intended 
to be a realistic representation of any particular adversary (e.g., an Al Qaeda cell), but a 
notional construct that allows us to identify worst-case disruptions. 
We also assume that the attack(s) will be simultaneous, and that immediately 
afterward our nation will be on elevated alert, with enhanced defenses. 
Thus, the second step in our overall analysis is to solve an optimization problem, 
called an attacker-defender (AD) model, which yields the worst-case disruption as a 
function of attacker capability.  By solving the AD model for different levels of attacker 
capability, we characterize the operational resilience of the system. 
Our ultimate objective is to improve the operational resilience of the system.  We 
do this by making defensive investments in component hardening, redundancy, capacity 
expansion, or the construction of new infrastructure.  Given that we have a limited budget 
for such investments, the key question is where to make investments so they have the 
greatest effect.  For any proposed improvement to the system, we can run the AD model 
to assess the extent to which it mitigates the worst-case disruption.  Given a list of 
defensive investment options and a specific budget, we form yet another optimization 
problem, called a defender-attacker-defender (DAD) model, whose solution identifies the 
combination of affordable investments that improves our operational resilience the most.  
This is the third, and final, step in our analysis. 
The 2010 NRC review of DHS approaches to risk analysis advocates the use of 
this technique with the following conclusion and recommendation. 
“Conclusion:  These network disruption and systems resilience models 
(which supplant and move away from current limitations of TVC 
analyses for CI/KR) are ideal for longer-term investment decisions and 
capabilities planning to enhance infrastructure systems’ resiliency, 
beyond just site-based protection.  Such models have been used in other 
private sector and military applications to assist decision-makers in 
improving continuity of operations. 
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Recommendation:  DHS should continue to enhance CI/KR data 
collection efforts and processes and should rapidly begin developing and 
using emerging state-of-the art network and systems disruption resiliency 
models to understand and characterize vulnerability and consequences of 
infrastructure disruptions” (NRC 2010, p. 69). 
Our report follows this NRC guidance in developing a model to assess the 
operational resilience of the MTS. 
C. PREVIOUS WORK ON PORT RESILIENCE AT THE NAVAL 
POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
There have been several studies conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) on port operations using the AD perspective. 
 Pidgeon (2008) develops a simulation model to estimate the costs associated with 
disruptions at major ports on the West Coast of the United States.  His operator’s model 
considers the advantageous choice by each incoming cargo ship of a U.S. port, given that 
some U.S. port facilities may have been closed by a maritime security event.  He then 
includes the movement of individual containers from each ship to land-based transport.  
He considers various scenarios, ranging from striking union workers to earthquakes in 
California, that could cause delays in the handling of containerized cargo, and he 
identifies infrastructure components that are potential bottlenecks and would impede the 
U.S. maritime shipping capacity.  He also identifies where commercial and government 
investment in additional seaport infrastructure would alleviate West Coast port 
congestion and improve the operational resilience of West Coast shipping. 
Bencomo (2009) extends this work to analyze the impact of various disruptions 
on the multi-modal transportation system for containerized cargo into and out of  
North America from both the East Coast and West Coast.  He considers a single 
integrated operator who ships by road, rail, and water to balance supplies and demands at 
minimum cost.  He develops an AD model, in which the attacker deliberately targets 
components to raise the shipper costs maximally.  He also considers the potential impact 
of labor strikes and natural disasters.  He suggests that future areas of study investigate 
more accurate representations of transport systems.  
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De la Cruz (2011) evaluates the ability of the MTS to import various goods into 
Hawaii via refrigerated and non-refrigerated containers.  Using AD modeling, he 
identifies system components (e.g., specific piers, cranes, and terminals) that are vital to 
maintain uninterrupted flow of containerized shipments.  His work assesses the 
operational resilience of the Hawaiian MTS in the presence of worst-case disruptions 
measured in terms of delivery shortages.  In addition, he analyzes the ability of the U.S. 
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor to serve as an alternate port for Honolulu Harbor.  By 
identifying key components of the system and analyzing the system’s resiliency to 
attacks, he identifies the greatest areas of need for improved equipment and  
increased capacity. 
Ileto (2011) uses an AD model to assess the resilience of the fuel supply chain of 
the Hawaiian Islands.  Crude oil is shipped from the mainland to two refineries on Oahu, 
where it is refined into automobile gasoline and fuel for electricity generation and 
aviation.  These finished products are transported by pipeline and truck on Oahu, and 
they are also transported by barge from Oahu to the neighboring islands.  Ileto identifies 
worst-case attacks and assesses their consequences.  He also uses the model to quantify 
the benefit of proposed defensive investments. 
All of these studies focus on the operation of “blue water” ports.  The Inland 
Waterways System of the United States, however, is a system of more than 25,000 miles 
of navigable waters in the eastern United States (Figure 2).  As of mid-2011, there had 
not been comparable analysis of inland port operations. 
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Figure 2. The Inland Waterway System. The Port of Pittsburgh, located in the upper 
right of the figure, is at the start of this river system.  Source:  PPC (2012b). 
D. OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
Following a visit in September 2011 by Alderson and Engel to the USCG Atlantic 
Area Operations Analysis Division (LANT-7) and a briefing of VADM Robert Parker, 
Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area, we were charged with developing a model of 
the Port of Pittsburgh as a proof-of-concept in using DAD analysis to assess the resilience 
of inland maritime operations in the presence of deliberate and non-deliberate 
disruptions. 
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Pittsburgh is currently the second-largest inland port and the 20th largest overall 
port in the United States (Port of Pittsburgh Commission 2012a).  It is uniquely located at 
the convergence of the Ohio, the Allegheny, and the Monongahela Rivers, known 
collectively as the Three Rivers.  These rivers connect to three of the four largest  
coal-mining states in the United States:  Kentucky, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania.  
There is $9 billion of commerce flowing through the Port of Pittsburgh annually, and coal 
comprises 76% of this total, making it by far the most influential commodity in this area 
(PPC 2012b).  This coal is critical for electricity generation and steel production.  
The Coast Guard interest in this project goes beyond protection of marine assets.  
“USCG missions and actions foster economic prosperity and national security by 
ensuring that the marine transportation system supplying food, energy, raw materials, 
consumer goods and technology is safe, secure, and reliable” (USCG 2011a, p. 6).  
Therefore, the USCG needs to understand the resilience of the system that moves coal 
through the Port of Pittsburgh along the Three Rivers. 
This study addresses the following questions: 
• How can we measure and assess the resilience of coal transport in the  
Port of Pittsburgh? 
• What, if anything, can the USCG do to improve this resilience, and how 
much will it help? 
• What would be required to extend this analysis to other parts of the Inland 
Waterway System? 
• What are the prospects for using operational resilience as a unifying 
concept for evaluating PWCS mission objectives and initiatives for the 
entire MTS? 
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II. COAL TRANSPORT IN THE PORT OF PITTSBURGH 
We begin with a descriptive model for marine transport in the Port of Pittsburgh.  
This requires that we understand the basic function and operations of this system, so as to 
be able to assess the consequences of disruption to that function.  River transportation is a 
primary means of moving large quantities of bulk commodities, and our focus is on the 
bulk shipment of coal. 
River transport depends on terminals, locks, and dams.  Dams maintain the water 
level, so large vessels can transit without running aground.  The body of water between 
two dams is known as a pool.  Dams create a tiered sequence of pools as one moves 
downstream through the river system.  Figure 3 illustrates the sequences of pools on the 
Monongahela River upstream from and including Pittsburgh.  Locks enable vessels to 
transition from one pool to the next by raising or lowering the water level in an enclosed 
chamber that connects the pools.  Passing through a lock, known as “locking-through,” 
can take 30 minutes to several hours, depending on the queued backlog, number of 
barges, and the number of parallel locks available for use. 
Terminals provide the means to move bulk commodities onto and off of the river, 
and can also provide temporary storage of a bulk commodity. 
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has responsibility for the 
continued operation of the Inland Waterway System.  In total, the USACE operates and 
maintains 12,000 miles of commercial inland navigation channels, including dredging 
riverbeds and repairing the 600 dams under its responsibility (USACE 2012).  The 
average age of the 192 inland waterway locks is 50 years (Gillis 2009).  For example, the 
Monongahela River has two of the oldest locks maintained by the USACE, built in 1905 
and 1907, yet in Calendar Year (CY) 2009, together they locked through 10,602 vessels 
carrying 26 million tons of cargo (USACE 2012). 
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Figure 3. Dams and pools on the Monongahela River.  Source:  USACE (2012). 
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Scheduled maintenance on locks and dams can create shipping delays of weeks to 
months, even when it is announced to the public far in advance.  Unscheduled loss of a 
lock or dam that results in an uncontrolled release of water can be even more disruptive 
and even have cascading effects, potentially damaging downstream infrastructure. 
The study area for our analysis radiates out from the Pittsburgh pool (i.e., between 
Emsworth Lock & Dam on the Ohio River, Braddock Lock & Dam on the Monongahela 
River, and Allegheny Lock & Dam 2 on the Allegheny River); see Figure 4.  It stretches 
up to the Allegheny Lock & Dam 5 on the Allegheny River, up to the Morgantown Lock 
& Dam on the Monongahela River, and down to the Hannibal Lock & Dam on the  
Ohio River. 
 
Figure 4. The Port of Pittsburgh consists of the Ohio, Monongahela, and Allegheny 
Rivers.  This picture illustrates the location of various locks and dams (L/D) in 
our study area, listed in the table to the right.  Along the Ohio River our study 
area is bounded by the Hannibal L/D, on the Allegheny River by the Allegheny 
L/D 5, on the Monongahela River by Morgantown L/D.  Source:  USACE 2012. 
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Collectively, there are 18 different pools in the study area; see Figure 5.  We label 
these in increasing order, starting downstream and moving upstream. 
 
Figure 5. We identify 18 relevant pools in this Three-River transport system. 
We have identified a total of 44 river terminals that have the ability to support 
coal movement.  In contrast to locks and dams, terminals tend to be privately owned and 
operated.  Because data regarding the transport of coal at these facilities is considered 
proprietary and a potential source of competitive advantage for the stakeholders, we refer 
to each terminal using a generic, but unique, identification number; see Figure 6.  These 
numbers are also sequential, increasing in value in the upstream direction, and with 
values that correspond to the pool to which they belong.  For example, Terminals 11-17 
are part of Pool 10, Terminals 21-24 are part of Pool 20, and so on.  We have invented a 
single artificial terminal, named the “Ohio Superterminal” (i.e., Terminal 0) to represent 
all terminals downstream from the Hannibal Lock and Dam on the Ohio River and 
therefore outside the study area. 
Pittsburgh
PIKE ISLAND LOCK & DAM
MP 84.2
NEW CUMBERLAND LOCK & DAM












GRAYS LANDING LOCK & DAM
MP 82
HANNIBAL LOCK & DAM
MP 126.4
























  21 
 
Figure 6. We identify 44 terminals that can serve as either the origin or destination 
for coal shipment in this river transport system. 
We obtained data on marine shipments for CY 2009 from the Army Corp of 
Engineers Planning Center of Expertise for Inland Navigation as well as the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration.  After filtering out records that did not pertain to the 
transport of coal, there were more than 2,600 individual recorded shipments, each with a 
specific origin (beginning point) and destination (ending point).  In cases where the origin 
or destination was downstream on the Ohio River and outside the study area, we simply 
used the Ohio Superterminal instead.  Table 1 summarizes the total flow of coal (in tons) 




























































  22 
 
Table 1. Total flows (in thousands of tons of coal) by terminal origin and destination during CY 2009.  Due to space limitations, 
we show only rows and columns that have nonzero entries. 
 
0 11 13 16 31 32 41 42 61 62 81 101 111 113 115 121 123 125 131 141 161 171 TOTAL
0 425.9 77.3 44.2 1.8 66.7 2694.1 5.2 60.5 744.5 29.1 131.8 75.6 4356.7
22 326.5 25.5 6.1 358.1
42 154.8 7.8 965.0 539.9 36.7 1704.1




115 90.7 10.5 101.2
122 8.8 2.9 11.8
124 54.1 60.7 114.8
131 1.4 3.3 101.7 77.7 184.1
132 920.2 10.0 216.9 10.0 331.7 809.9 14.7 38.6 0.6 618.5 487.5 3458.6
142 3631.5 39.9 468.4 85.2 237.4 406.6 71.5 327.2 1361.3 6628.8
151 9.3 143.9 153.2
152 1.0 36.5 72.6 32.6 142.8
162 26.5 1.1 4.1 61.4 671.8 664.3 1429.1
163 1.0 180.9 181.9
171 8.1 8.1
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The origin-destination matrix in Table 1 is sparse—only a relatively small number 
of terminals serve as the source or destination for coal shipments, and shipments to or 
from a terminal tend to have a small number of other terminals to whom they ship or 
from whom they receive.  The row sums and column sums of Table 1 reveal the total 
amount of coal shipped or received by terminal, which we summarize by rank order in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Total amount of coal (in thousands of tons) shipped or received at each 
terminal of the Port of Pittsburgh in 2009. 
The majority of coal moves through only a very small number of terminals:  the 
top five shipping terminals account for more than 92% of all coal shipped by volume, and 
the top five receiving terminals account for more than 77% of all coal received. 
We also use the data in Table 1 to determine the total amount of coal that moves 
through each of the pools, and therefore each of the locks.  Because there is only one way 
to move coal along the river, we know that, for example, a shipment of coal that 
originates at a terminal in Pool 10 and is delivered to a terminal in Pool 30 must also pass 
RANK TERMINAL TONS % OF TOTAL RANK TERMINAL TONS % OF TOTAL
1 142 6628.8 34.97% 1 0 4788.4 25.27%
2 0 4356.7 22.99% 2 141 4081.8 21.54%
3 132 3458.6 18.25% 3 113 2694.1 14.22%
4 42 1704.1 8.99% 4 161 1980.8 10.45%
5 162 1429.1 7.54% 5 81 1079.1 5.69%
6 22 358.1 1.89% 6 62 749.9 3.96%
7 131 184.1 0.97% 7 125 744.5 3.93%
8 163 181.9 0.96% 8 111 473.3 2.50%
9 151 153.2 0.81% 9 31 469.8 2.48%
10 152 142.8 0.75% 10 61 429.2 2.26%
11 124 114.8 0.61% 11 123 376.5 1.99%
12 115 101.2 0.53% 12 131 356.3 1.88%
13 43 61.9 0.33% 13 41 237.4 1.25%
14 101 35.5 0.19% 14 13 216.9 1.14%
15 114 19.6 0.10% 15 32 95.2 0.50%
16 122 11.8 0.06% 16 121 49.1 0.26%
17 171 8.1 0.04% 17 171 42.8 0.23%
18 112 1.6 0.01% 18 16 39.9 0.21%
SUM 18951.8 100.00% 19 115 34.0 0.18%
20 11 10.0 0.05%
21 101 1.8 0.01%
22 42 1.1 0.01%
SUM 18951.8 100.00%
SHIPPED BY ORIGIN RECEIVED BY DESTINATION
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through Pool 20.  Our sequential numbering scheme allows us to quickly compute the 
total flow of coal moving through each pool in both the upstream and downstream 
directions.  These appear in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Rank ordering of locks in terms of CY 2009 coal that was “locked 
through” in the upstream, downstream, and combined directions. 
Not surprisingly, the most-heavily used locks are those surrounding Pittsburgh in 
Pool 60—Emsworth Lock & Dam on the Ohio River and Monongahela Lock #2 on the 
Monongahela River—that locked through the most coal overall in 2009, with nearby 
locks playing a significant role in both the upstream and downstream directions. 
Our coal shipment data include individual transport dates, which allow us to look 
for seasonal patterns in these coal shipments.  Appendix A presents the total  
week-by-week movement of coal through each of the pools during 2009.  Figures 7 and 8 
summarize this data on a month-by-month basis. 
RANK LOCK KILOTONS RANK LOCK KILOTONS RANK LOCK KILOTONS
T1 LOCK 40-50 6,480.8    1 LOCK 130-120 7,546.3 1 LOCK 60-50 12,652.3 
T1 LOCK 50-60 6,480.8    2 LOCK 120-110 7,351.6 2 LOCK 110-60 12,482.9 
3 LOCK 60- 110 5,440.8    3 LOCK 110-60 7,042.1 3 LOCK 50-40 12,302.9 
T4 LOCK20- 30 4,714.8    4 LOCK 60-50 6,171.5 4 LOCK 40-30 10,299.5 
T4 LOCK30- 40 4,714.8    5 LOCK 50-40 5,822.1 5 LOCK 120-110 10,022.7 
T6 LOCK 0-10 4,356.7    6 LOCK 40-30 5,584.7 6 LOCK 30-20 9,734.5    
T6 LOCK 10-20 4,356.7    7 LOCK 140-130 5,414.4 7 LOCK 20-10 9,376.4    
8 LOCK 130-140 2,977.0    T8 LOCK 20-10 5,019.7 8 LOCK 130-120 9,368.7    
9 LOCK 110-120 2,671.1    T8 LOCK 30-20 5,019.7 9 LOCK 10-0 9,145.1    
10 LOCK 120-130 1,822.4    10 LOCK 10-0 4,788.4 10 LOCK 140-130 8,391.5    
11 LOCK 150-160 1,178.4    11 LOCK 150-140 1,037.3 11 LOCK 150-140 2,183.1    
12 LOCK 140-150 1,145.8    12 LOCK 160-150 774.0     12 LOCK 160-150 1,952.4    
T13 LOCK 60-70 210.3       T13 LOCK 100-90 35.5       T13 LOCK 70-60 245.8       
T13 LOCK 70-80 210.3       T13 LOCK 70-60 35.5       T13 LOCK 80-70 245.8       
15 LOCK160- 170 42.8          T13 LOCK 80-70 35.5       15 LOCK 170-160 50.9         
16 LOCK 80-90 1.8            T13 LOCK 90-80 35.5       T16 LOCK 100-90 37.3         
17 LOCK 90-100 1.8            17 LOCK 170-160 8.1         T16 LOCK 90-80 37.3
UPSTREAM TRANSIT DOWNSTREAM TRANSIT COMBINED TRANSIT
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Figure 7. Coal flows through the Pittsburgh study area by four-week “month” 
during 2009.  Seasonal fluctuations are mostly consistent across pools, with the 
first eight weeks of the CY showing the largest overall flows. 
 
Figure 8. Coal flow through each pool in the Pittsburgh area.  Pools 0 through 60 
constitute the Ohio River.  Pools 70 through 100 constitute the Allegheny River.  
Pools 110 through 170 constitute the Monongahela River.  In gray scale, the 



































































Coal Flow by Pool
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In summary, data about coal movement on the Ohio, Allegheny, and 
Monongahela Rivers provides a sense of transport operations under normal conditions.  
We observe that the majority of coal movement on the Ohio River originates from 
outside the study area and moves upstream toward Pittsburgh, while on the Monongahela 
River the majority of flow originates at mines on the river itself and then moves 
downstream toward Pittsburgh.  We can identify the pools, locks, and terminals that 
carried the most volume of coal on a weekly, monthly, or annual basis. 
These historical flows also allow for a rudimentary “what-if” analysis:  if a pool, 
lock, or terminal is damaged for a period of time, we can estimate the impact based on 
the amount of flow that used those components during a similar epoch.  Doing this, 
however, implicitly assumes that coal shipments do not adjust in their routing or volume 
in the face of damaged infrastructure.  In practice, we recognize that coal transport 
companies proactively manage their shipments to mitigate any such disruptions.  
Capturing this perspective, however, requires a deeper style of analysis and additional 
modeling detail, which we address next with our optimization-based models. 
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III. APPLYING DEFENDER-ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODELS 
TO THE INLAND WATERWAY SYSTEM 
The starting point in applying DAD modeling is the development of an 
appropriate operator’s model for marine transport in the Port of Pittsburgh.  Although 
there are multiple modes of transport for coal in this region, the enormous capacity of the 
river system and its low operating costs make it the primary means of bulk commodity 
shipment through the Port of Pittsburgh.  The Port of Pittsburgh Commission reports that 
“inland waterway transportation is generally the least-costly transportation mode.  
Average cost ranges between $0.005 and $0.01 per ton-mile of cargo moved.  This 
compares to nearly $0.05 for rail and $0.10 for truck” (PPC 2012b).  Figure 9 shows 
cargo capacity of different modes of transport; clearly barges can carry much more cargo. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of cargo capacity of rail car, truck, and barge.   
Source:  PPC (2012c). 
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In practice, the most cost-effective means for moving coal on the river is via 
multiple barges pushed by a single towboat.  Figure 10 displays a “12-barge tow.” 
 
Figure 10. The most economical way to move coal is by barge.   
Source:  USACE 2012. 
The interruption of coal delivery along these primary river-shipment routes would 
have significant implications.  In the short term, rail transport might not be able to pick 
up the slack because of limited capacity and availability of rail cars.  Additionally, 
transporting large volumes of coal via truck could place an extreme burden on the road 
network, causing immediate bottlenecks in and around the Pittsburgh metropolitan area.  
In the long term, the large demand volumes for coal could make it cost prohibitive to 
supply adequate quantities by means other than river. 
Many coal consumers maintain some level of reserves on hand to mitigate 
fluctuations in delivery or consumption rates and for emergency situations.  These 
reserves are finite, however, and steel manufacturers in the Pittsburgh region cannot run 
out of coal or they risk huge financial loses and catastrophic facility “cold shutdowns.” 
Thus, the key tensions driving the movement of coal are transport costs and 
severe operating penalties for running out of coal at an energy provider or a steel mill. 
A. BUILDING THE OPERATOR’S MODEL 
Our modeling of river operations has evolved with several research efforts. 
Engel (2011) builds a network flow model of coal transport (see Ahuja et al., 
1993, pp. 1–20, for relevant background information).  Each individual arc represents 
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either river or rail transport, with a per-ton transport cost.  The transport cost on river arcs 
is lower than on rail arcs.  Each demand location has a per-ton penalty cost for a coal 
shortage.  The network is a simplified view of the Point of Pittsburgh where the Three 
Rivers meet, and rail arcs represent abstract movement directly from source to 
destination.  The demand for traffic is derived from our 2009 USACE data, but 
aggregated to consider net supplies or demands.  That is, if a particular terminal was both 
an origin and a destination for coal over the year, only the net difference is input to this 
model.  The time horizon for this model is a single week, and there are no provisions for 
inventory.  The solution to this operator’s model is the set of coal movements that satisfy 
demand at minimum cost, while observing capacity constraints and other restrictions on 
allowable flow. 
Engel (2011) additionally presents an AD model based on cost-based interdiction.  
Interdiction is commonly defined as “activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, 
intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and 
cargo” (Department of Defense, 2011, p. I-1).  For the rest of this report, we use 
interdiction (or attack) to mean the interruption of commodity movement through our 
system.  In cost-based interdiction, we assign a per-unit penalty cost to each arc; if this 
arc is attacked, then this arc incurs both the normal per-unit transport cost and the  
per-unit penalty cost (see Brown et al. 2005, Alderson et al. 2011, or Dixon 2011 for 
background information).  Using notional cost data, Engel’s analysis provides proof-of-
concept about the potential insights from the application of this technique to river 
operations. 
Onuska (2012) develops a multicommodity, multimodal network flow model of 
coal transport in this region, focusing (solely for economy of exposition) on the 
Monogahela River.  He presents a detailed network of nodes and arcs representing coal 
transport on river, rail, and roads, and with explicit transfer operations to move coal from 
one mode to another.  Each mode of transport has finite capacities with its own costs.  
Onuska uses USACE transport data from 2009 to generate synthetic “contracts”  
(i.e., source, destination, quantity, date) for network demand, based on historical 
shipments.  This model allows for multiple time periods and accounts for inventory to be 
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carried from one time period to the next.  His operator’s model routes flows in order to 
satisfy contracted supplies and demands at minimum transportation cost. 
In this report, we extend the analysis using the model first presented in  
Onuska (2012), which we summarize here, but repeat in its entirety in Appendix B for 
completeness.  This model mimics the real-world behavior of coal transport in the  
Port of Pittsburgh and allows for systematic investigation of “what if” disruption 
scenarios (see Figure 11).  For example, to assess the impact of a terminal closure, one 
updates the input data to the operator’s model to reduce (possibly to zero) the capacity of 
the terminal of interest.  The consequence of this scenario is then measured in terms of 
the resulting changes in flows, shortages, and costs.  If the operating costs do not change 
as a result of the terminal closure, then the system has the ability to adjust its flows 
without any adverse effect, and we conclude that the terminal in question is not critical 
(i.e., not critical individually).  Alternatively, we might say that the system was 
“operationally resilient” to the loss of that terminal. 
 
Figure 11. The operator’s model takes input data on terminals, networks for each 
mode of transport, contracts, and costs.  Its output identifies the shipping, 
transfers, and storage that result in the lowest possible cost, possibly including 
shortages at some destinations. 
Terminals
• location (latitude, longitude)
• inventory capacity and holding cost
• connectivity and capacity of transfers  
to river, rail, and road networks
River network
• connectivity and capacity of locks
Rail network 
• connectivity and capacity of rail lines
Road network
• connectivity and capacity of roads
Contracts (demand)
• origin, destination,  dates, volume
• by commodity type
Costs
• transport (river, rail, road)
• penalty (shortage, contract)
• how much coal (of each type) 
to ship (by river, rail, or road) 
from origin to destination, 
week-by-week
• coal inventories at each 
terminal, week-by-week
• the sizes, locations, and dates 
of coal shortages, if any
• total operating cost
Operator’s
Model
What To Do To Minimize Costs
Scenario Inputs
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Given an appropriately validated operator’s model and a specified attacker 
capability, the AD model finds the worst-case scenario, defined as the one that yields 
highest operating cost, even after the operator has rebalanced flows as best as possible, 
after suffering loss of capacity or components.  In this case, we typically specify attacker 
capability in terms a maximum number of attacks or a more general budget (e.g., number 
of personnel). 
B. ASSUMED INPUT DATA 
In this analysis, we assume the following input data. 
1. Terminals 
Terminals are locations that serve as origin, destination, and/or transshipment 
points for coal and can also serve as storage locations.  Terminals are typically limited in 
their capacity to transfer commodities on or off a specific mode of shipment.  Each 
terminal is unique and its transfer capacity depends on the availability of different coal 
handling equipment (e.g., conveyors, electric whirler cranes, hoists, or clamshell 
buckets).  Additionally, some terminals are not accessible by every mode of 
transportation.  For instance, some terminals do not have rail lines or have limited  
road access. 
We assume the average cost for loading coal onto barges, rail cars, or trucks is 
$0.15 per ton.  Because offloading is more labor intensive and costs are higher, we 
assume the cost of this is $0.30 per ton. 
We assume that any terminal node can carry inventory.  In practice, however, 
power plants typically carry a certain amount of inventory (on average, a 45-day supply) 
in order to compensate for interruptions in supply such as miner’s strikes and/or holidays, 
adverse weather, or transportation problems (Phillips 2008).  Coal is inventoried in closed 
silos and open storage. 
2. River Network 
For the purposes of our analysis, we assume that an individual river segment has 
unlimited capacity.  Each lock, however, has an assumed throughput capacity of 30.24 
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million tons per week.  We assume that the costs of transporting commodities by river are 
less than other modes of travel, and we use an assumed cost per ton-mile of $0.008. 
3. Rail Network 
The railroad network around the Port of Pittsburgh is extensive, with considerable 
path diversity that allows for rerouting in the presence of an interdiction.  For this reason, 
we do not explicitly model rail capacity, except at bridges that serve as natural 
bottlenecks.  Like locks on a river, bridges can create bottlenecks for rail traffic, because 
only a finite number of trains can traverse the bridge during a given time epoch.  We 
assume each bridge has throughput capacity of 28.5 million tons per week. 
In practice, there might be additional capacity limitations due to other bottlenecks 
and limited availability of rail cars or engines.  Although we could model these additional 
features explicitly, in this analysis we have not. 
We assume that the average cost to move coal by rail car is $0.05 per ton-mile 
(PPC 2012b). 
4. Road Network 
The road network around the Port of Pittsburgh is even more extensive than the 
rail network, and for this reason we do not explicitly model road segments and their 
capacity, except at bridges that create bottlenecks and limit total throughput.  There are a 
total of 75 road bridges that cross the Ohio, Monongahela, and Allegheny Rivers.  We 
assume each road bridge can handle 1.75 million tons of coal per week. 
Transporting coal by trucks on roads is the most expensive option, which we 
assume is $0.10 per ton-mile (PPC 2012b). 
5. Contracts 
Actual coal shipments reflect contracts between producers (mines) and consumers 
(utilities and steel producers).  Our working definition is that a contract is an agreed on 
shipment of a specific commodity amount from an origin (producer) to a destination 
(consumer) at a specific time.  In this analysis, we consider two types of coal, creatively 
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labeled as COAL_A and COAL_B, which, respectively, represent bituminous coal (used 
for energy) and lignite coal (used for steel production). 
In practice, we have no knowledge of future contracted shipments (only the 
shippers do), so we use past shipments as a proxy for representative levels of demand. 
6. Penalty Costs 
Our operator’s model accounts for the costs to transfer coal onto and off of each 
mode of transport, as well as the cost to move it along each mode of transport.  The 
model, however, is also driven by two additional penalty costs.  We impose one (large) 
per-ton penalty cost if the system is unable to satisfy demand (i.e., deliver coal) at a 
terminal when it is needed.  We set this penalty cost sufficiently high so that the system 
will find a (possibly expensive) path to deliver coal if it is feasible to do so.  In our 
analysis, however, this penalty is arbitrary and does not reflect an actual cost.  In practice, 
one could perform in-depth analysis of the economic or other “downstream” implications 
(e.g., impact on other infrastructures or industries) of not having coal when it is needed.  
When used as inputs to the operator’s model, these more realistic penalty costs allow for 
the assessment of when it makes sense to pay a premium to find other ways of getting 
coal or make defensive investments in the infrastructure, as opposed to simply allowing 
the system to “fail” in delivering coal. 
We include a second (smaller) per-ton penalty cost that is imposed when the 
system does not satisfy (i.e., “breaks”) a contracted flow between origin and destination.  
As evidenced by the origin-destination flows in Table 1, the Port of Pittsburgh has the 
same coal moving in opposite directions along the river.  This is because these flows 
represent the contracts between different shippers and consumers.  A perfectly integrated 
and efficient system would not allow such crossing flows; rather, it would satisfy demand 
for coal at each terminal at the lowest cost because distance is a big component of cost.  
This would likely mean that coal demand would be satisfied locally, without regard to the 
actual buyer or seller.  This additional per-ton penalty discourages this by imposing an 
additional cost on non-contracted, origin-destination pairs, so that the lowest-cost 
shipment in the system is the contracted one.  In our analysis, this penalty is arbitrary in 
the sense that it does not reflect an actual cost.  Rather, we set this penalty high enough so 
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that contacted flows are maintained during normal operation, but low enough that it 
makes sense for the system to break contracts in order to reroute flows and avoid 
shortages at demand points.  Again, additional data on the actual costs of breaking 
contracts could be included in these penalty costs.  This would then make it possible to 
use the operator’s model to explore the real trade-offs between allowing the system to 
“fail” in delivering coal vice finding a way to deliver coal “at any cost.” 
Our operator’s model allows us to set the shortfall penalties individually by 
commodity type at each terminal.  In our analysis here, we set the shortfall penalties 
uniformly at $10,000 per ton for each type of coal.  We also set the penalties for breaking 
contracts uniformly at $0.75 per ton. 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE MONONGAHELA RIVER 
Following Onuska (2012), we focus attention on the Monongahela River, which 
carries a significant amount of coal through our system.  This reduced system has 8 
pools, 24 terminals, 9 rail bridges, and 12 road bridges.  The time horizon for this 
analysis is limited to a single week in which there is a total contracted flow of 167,032 
tons of coal.  In the absence of any disruption, the system is able to satisfy all contracts at 
a total baseline cost of $225,450.  Of this cost, $153,416 comes from the transport of over 
19 million ton-miles of coal on the river and $74,034 in transfer costs on and off  
the river. 
The operator’s model allows us to consider the consequence on system 
performance of any change in system inputs, and to do this in a systematic manner.  
When considering risks to the MTS, we are particularly interested in changes that reduce 
the connectivity, capacity, or capability of the system.  We first consider the possible 
disruptions to the “waterside” of the system.  If the system had a dam fail, we assume that 
the pool that it supports would become unnavigable; in terms of the model, this means 
that barges could not transit that pool.  If a lock were to become inoperable, then we 
assume that barges could not transit between its adjacent pools.  If a river terminal were 
to become inoperable, then we assume that coal could not be transferred on or off the 
river at that location. 
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Not surprisingly, the single most costly attack is to Pool 60 (see Figure 5) at the 
intersection of the Three Rivers in Pittsburgh itself.  This essentially cuts off all river 
traffic into and out of the Monongahela River, and it also stops the local river transport of 
coal through that pool.  This forces the operator to move the majority of coal by rail to its 
destination.  This disruption causes a decrease in river transport, because a large amount 
of cargo is shipped from the Monongahela River to destinations outside of the 
Monongahela River and a large amount of cargo is shipped from origins outside of the 
Monongahela River to destinations on it.  This yields more than twice the operating costs, 
at $559,204.  Coal is now primarily delivered via rail, and transfer costs have increased 
nearly 40%, to $100,513. 
 Figure 12 compares the top 15 largest-consequence “waterside” attacks.  Baseline 
operations are highlighted in green and the most impactful attacks are listed in 
descending order.  The first four worst attacks are attacks on dams.  The next most 
impactful attack occurs at a lock. 
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Figure 12. Baseline operating costs (left-most, green) and the cost of the best 15 single attacks to the Monongahela River.  Dams 
are attacked first, restricting navigation through pools.  Locks are then attacked, restricting the ability to transit between pools.
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Simultaneous disruptions may occur at multiple, separate locations.  These 
simultaneous attacks have the potential to increase costs above the cost of a single,  
worst-case disruption.  The worst-case scenario for two simultaneous attacks occurs at 
Pool 60 and Pool 130 (see Figure 5).  This attack causes total operating costs to rise to 
$598,421.  In this case, the operator must ship the majority of coal via rail, while some is 
still moved via river.  We observe that, in this case, transfer costs actually decrease from 
the single attack scenario because the operator chooses to ship directly from source to 
destination via rail, rather than transferring coal to the river, partly using the river, and 
then transferring to rail for the remainder of the trip.  With two simultaneous attacks, the 
operator avoids multiple loading and offloading transfers.  Table 4 displays  
these statistics. 
  
Table 4. Most impactful simultaneous attacks:  0 through 5.  For two simultaneous 
attacks, 213,250 tons of coal is transported via river and 153,742 tons of coal is 
transported via rail.  The cost to operate the system becomes $598,421. 
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We maintain this standard of conveying operating results throughout the 
remainder of this analysis.  As the number of attacks increases, barge use decreases, and 
rail car and truck use increases.  Table 4 deconstructs the costs associated with each mode 
of transport, beginning with zero attacks and ending with five simultaneous attacks.  
Looking at the MODAL COST in Table 4, it becomes apparent that transportation costs 
rise dramatically following the initial attack(s).  In the case when all waterside assets are 
vulnerable, attacks on dams result in worst-case increase in cost, even after river 
operations adjust flows to minimize transport costs.  Details of the specific pools, locks, 
and terminals that constitute each worst-case attack are available in Onuska (2012). 
Figure 13 illustrates how the overall system cost increases with additional attacks.  
In practice, we often refer to this figure as the resilience curve, because it characterizes 
the ability of the system to function in the presence of increasing disruption (see Alderson 
et al. 2012 for a detailed discussion of resilience curves).  In this context, we use number 
of simultaneous attacks to characterize the size of the disruption.  For this reason, we can 
also interpret this figure as the attacker’s return on investment (ROI) curve. 
 
Figure 13. The resilience curve for coal transport on the Monongahela River in the 
absence of defenses.  With only one or two coordinated attacks, the total 
operating cost of the system dramatically increases.  The addition of a third, 
fourth, or fifth attack on water assets does little to further increase the  
operating cost. 
The shape of Figure 13 quantifies what stakeholders in the Port of Pittsburgh have 
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assets can inflict significant pain on the transport of coal.  The next natural question is:  
how does the protection of assets on the river mitigate these potential disruptions? 
Imagine that the USCG, perhaps in coordination with the USACE, could perfectly 
protect dams so that they would never fail and are invulnerable to attack.  Under these 
conditions, an observant and intelligent attacker knows that targeting dams has no effect 
and therefore turns attention elsewhere.  Not surprisingly, the worst-case attack is now on 
locks instead of dams, and the attacker’s ROI is reduced.  Figure 14 illustrates how the 
resilience curve changes in the presence of different defensive efforts.  Specifically, 
perfect defense of dams significantly reduces the total operating cost in the presence of 
one or more attacks.  In this case, the resilience curve shifts down, indicating that 
consequences of a worst-case attack are less than before. 
 
Figure 14. Resilience curves for coal transport in the presence of different defensive 
efforts.  Perfect defense of dams lowers the curve (from circles to squares).  
Defense of dams and locks causes an attacker to consider landside assets.  If an 
attacker can isolate a terminal by interdicting all three transfers (to river, road, and 
rail), then the operating cost becomes arbitrarily high (triangles).  If we assume 
that coal can always be transported by road and that locks and dams can be 
perfectly protected, then the worst case disruption is more modest, even in the 
presence of multiple losses (diamonds). 
Continuing this thought experiment, imagine that the USCG could perfectly 
defend both locks and dams.  In this situation, the intelligent attacker will shift attention 
to terminals and their ability to transfer coal to and from river, rail, and road networks.  
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increase, unless an attacker can isolate a terminal by completely interdicting its ability to 
send or receive coal.  In this case, the resulting “cost” of that isolation can be arbitrarily 
high, depending on the penalty costs chosen to reflect the economic consequences at that 
terminal.  In the scenario here, these penalties are such that isolating a terminal yields a 
higher cost than disabling a dam (see Figure 14). 
This study considers only a single penalty cost that is the same for all terminals; 
thus, the terminals targeted are the ones that move the largest volumes of coal.  A closer 
look at the individual consumers of coal in the region (e.g., electricity generators and 
steel manufacturers) would likely reveal, however, that the consequence associated with 
not having coal at some terminals is higher than at others.  Again, the penalty costs in our 
model allow the analyst to specify these in the context of different “what-if” scenarios. 
In practice, roads can be rebuilt in relatively short time, and so it might be 
unrealistic to think it is possible to completely isolate a terminal for a long period of time.  
So, we consider a final scenario in which dams and locks are perfectly defended on the 
water and where transfers to the road network are invulnerable to attack.  Figure 14 
shows the value associated with this level of resilience:  while attacks increase the total 
operating cost to move coal, it is significantly less than it would be otherwise. 
A decision to protect locks and dams, if such defenses are even possible, is not 
without cost.  Quantifying resilience in this manner allows for a specific type of  
cost-benefit analysis:  does the improvement in resilience, as measured by the shift in 
curves in Figure 14, justify the associated costs?  This report does not pursue a detailed 
cost analysis of defensive actions, but such efforts are natural next steps in an assessment 
of operational resilience for the Port of Pittsburgh or other ports. 
D. ANALYSIS NOT (YET) PERFORMED 
Our model for the operation of coal transport in the Port of Pittsburgh contains 
features that we have not exercised, but that we perceive are important for future analysis 
in Pittsburgh and other ports. 
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1. Multiperiod Analysis 
Our analysis of the resilience of coal transport considers a time horizon of only a 
single, week-long time period.  Our model, however, allows us to consider the transport 
of coal over a much longer time horizon, and more time periods, which is important for 
several reasons. 
First, it is natural, in this context, to measure repair times for critical infrastructure 
in weeks.  Our model allows us to incorporate domain-specific knowledge about the 
actual repair times.  For example, we might know that transfer equipment (i.e., conveyors 
or cranes) takes two weeks to repair.  Because locks are uniquely constructed and their 
repairs are labor-intensive tasks, however, we might assume their repairs take four or 
more weeks each.  Moreover, because dams require the most time-consuming repairs, we 
might assume that these take 13 or more weeks each.  Furthermore, we might assume that 
roads and rail lines can be repaired within one week; if so, then their repair times might 
be negligible, as these repairs can be accomplished within a single time period. 
Second, because of the severe consequences of running out of coal, individual 
coal consumers tend to keep a reserve inventory on hand to use if coal shipments are 
disrupted for some period of time.  Thus, assessing the situations under which there are 
shortfalls depends on both the actual inventories and the actual repair times. 
Given coal inventories and repair times, then the loss of a dam, lock, or transfer 
capacity at a terminal can result in a disruption that lasts for several weeks.  The solution 
of the operator’s model reveals the best way to transport coal over the entire planning 
horizon, to include a means for working around damaged components and then resuming 
their use when they become available for use again.  In the case where we consider an 
unannounced (surprise) loss of infrastructure, running the operator’s model identifies 
how best to respond by rerouting coal flows and using coal inventories judiciously, and 
the resulting cost provides a more realistic estimate of the actual consequences. 
We can also use the multiperiod planning feature in our model to consider the 
potential consequence of a planned future interruption of system function; for example, 
from the planned shutdown of a lock for preventative maintenance.  We can think of a 
future outage as an “attack” that is announced in advance; in this case, the solution to the 
operator’s model will reveal how to plan anticipatory shipments and preposition coal 
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storage.  Thus, we can use the operator’s model as a planning tool to assess the impact of 
proposed closures on key infrastructure assets, and measure the consequences of such 
proposed closures in units that are relevant to system function. 
2. Including More Detailed Rail and Road Systems 
In this analysis, we include only the simplest representation of the rail and road 
networks.  Specifically, we assume that there is sufficient path diversity on land that the 
only potential sources of disruption of these networks are the bridges over the rivers.  In 
practice, the local terrain contains hills and valleys that often funnel rail lines and roads 
through areas that create bottlenecks and could serve as a serious potential disruption, 
either in isolation or in conjunction with a disruption on a river.  The data for these rail 
and road networks are readily available, but incorporating it at an appropriate level of 
detail for use in our model will require time on the part of analysts.  Before doing so, we 
recommend a preliminary assessment to determine whether we believe this additional 
level of detail has the potential to change the basic insights of this analysis. 
3. Expanding the Scope to the Rest of the Three Rivers 
Our analysis of the Monongahela River can be extended in a straightforward 
manner to include the Allegheny River and upper portion of the Ohio River.  To do this 
requires additional effort to development raw data into a form that can be used as input to 
the operator’s model.  It will also require additional effort to exercise the model through 
the various “what-if” scenarios necessary to gain insight about coal transport in this 
broader area.  Even though the Monongahela River carries some of the highest coal 
volumes for local traffic, nearly all of the coal that enters or exits the Three Rivers region 
does so via the Ohio River.  So it is possible that the worst-case disruption is, in fact, 
downstream from Pittsburgh.  The idea that the worst-case disruption to a system can be 
one that is far away is something that we have observed in many studies of infrastructure. 
E. PERFORMING THIS ANALYSIS FOR OTHER RIVER PORTS 
Our design of the operator’s model is generic, in the sense that it can be applied to 
the movement of any continuous commodities through any ports on a river system.  In 
this study, we focus on different types of coal moving through Pittsburgh, but the same 
  43 
basic model could be applied, for example, to the movement of grain, fertilizer, or potash 
in the Port of Louisville, Kentucky.  Although the mathematical model is ready for such 
application, the biggest “expense” in studying another river port will be in data 
development.  We comment briefly on this. 
We anticipate that we can use the same USACE shipment data as a starting point 
for identifying the most significant origins and destinations for each type of cargo.  
Again, although historical data is not a perfect proxy for future contracted shipments, it 
serves as a reasonable and defensible starting point for looking at the potential disruption 
of historical shipments.  This first level of analysis, as performed in Section II of this 
report, does not require the use of the operator’s model, and the data development 
requirements are considerably less.  It is possible that by simply understanding the 
aggregate cargo movements in a comprehensive way, one obtains sufficient insight into 
the relative importance of different facilities along the river, and that this insight is 
enough to inform Coast Guard decision making on the allocation of resources in advance 
of a disruptive event. 
The development of data and its use in an operator’s model, as in Section III of 
this report, provides a more detailed and comprehensive means to consider “what-if” 
scenarios.  We can explore how the system will respond to specific damage in scenarios 
of concern, whether deliberately inflicted or not.  By using our hypothetical attacker, we 
can identify worst-case disruptions and assess whether the best-case response of the 
system as it currently stands would be sufficient.  If we discover that the system will not 
function adequately, then we can consider specific investment or prepositioning measures 
that would mitigate this. 
Having an operator’s model and input data for a specific river port, however, also 
puts us in position to respond to emergent events, by allowing us to quickly consider 
different courses of action following a disruption.  That is, we can use the operator’s 
model to help coordinate (or at least advise) the activities of the port or broader river 
system in an integrated manner.  This could be useful not only to the Coast Guard, but to 
emergency responders and executive decision makers at the local, state, and  
federal levels. 
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F. DISCUSSION 
The DAD decision support model described in this report is qualitatively different 
from the risk-based models currently in use by the USCG.  Our models do not require 
probabilistic risk assessment of any attacker intent, nor do we require any probabilistic 
assessment of vulnerability to attack.  Following standard military planning doctrine, we 
plan based on attacker capabilities, not intent.  We note that the only situation where 
military planners might assess attacker intent is when the time horizon is very short and 
intelligence is very strong.  This is a rare situation that we cannot rely on for continued, 
routine planning to defend our infrastructure.  Further, even if we do assess these 
probabilities of intent and vulnerability, they are obviously not independent as is 
customarily assumed (i.e., an attacker will surely change his probability in response to 
any change in vulnerability).  We avoid these complications, and the requirement that 
such probabilities be stated for some fixed time epoch. 
We reiterate that our attacker model is not intended to represent the actual 
decision process of any specific adversary (e.g., Al Qaeda), rather we use it as a 
mechanism to discover worst-case disruptions to system function.  Real terrorists might 
not have the ability to identify the combination of terminals, locks, and dams that yield 
the worst-case disruption of the transport of coal.  Given the growing sophistication of 
adversaries everywhere, along with the possibility of an “insider threat,” we argue that it 
would be imprudent to assume that they are not able to do so. 
Our model does not require consequence values associated with the loss of 
individual components, nor do we assume that the consequences associated with losing 
multiple components is merely additive.  By explicitly representing the interaction 
between components and how they behave as a system, we can solve for the disruption to 
function associated with the loss of sets of components and then find the sets that are 
most critical. 
In practice, system operators need to maintain function, no matter the source of 
disruption.  So if a “perfect storm” of unlikely events involving a combination of 
scheduled maintenance, component failure, and human error could suddenly lead to loss 
three critical components, we want to know this in advance, and how to respond to it. 
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The USCG already maintains systems that collect information about infrastructure 
components of the MTS.  These are ideal to use in support of the DAD decision support 
system we describe.  Much of the required data are already collected and tended, but 
additional work is required to leverage these investments for use in the models  
described here. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Rivers are an extremely important part of the MTS, and the Port of Pittsburgh 
offers a valuable target to an adversary looking to cause deliberate harm to coal transport.  
With approximately $9 billion in annual commerce, the second-largest inland port in the 
United States could be significantly impacted with just a single attack, causing operating 
costs to rise nearly 150%.  Adversaries are plotting to disrupt commerce, as evidenced by 
the recent planned attack on a bridge in neighboring Ohio (Barrett 2012).  The use of 
system interdiction techniques allows us to identify the most critical infrastructure in our 
system; in our case, this is the dams that support pool navigability.  This modeling 
method allows us to quantify impacts to operating costs and consider various alternate 
scenarios concerning defense tactics and schemes. 
The analysis in this report provides one view on the resilience of the  
Port of Pittsburgh, specifically in terms of its coal transport operations.  This analysis also 
suggests a general technique for assessing the operational resilience of the Inland MTS 
more broadly.  The benefits of this technique, however, need to be weighed carefully 
against resource requirements, because the Coast Guard faces key decisions about the use 
of limited resources, both for the execution of its PWCS mission and also for analysis in 
support of this mission. 
The DAD technique in this report is distinctly different from the currently 
fashionable, risk-based models for assessing the criticality of infrastructure.  It does not 
suffer from the need to guess at adversary intent, nor does it presume to know in advance 
the consequence from losing a combination of infrastructure assets.  It focuses instead on 
what we d0 know:  how our infrastructures function on a day-to-day basis.  By explicitly 
modeling the function of the system as managed by an operator, the model allows for an 
assessment of consequences that is operationally relevant, realistic, and defensible.  It has 
the potential to serve as an important tool for assisting the Coast Guard with its planning, 
both before and after disruptions to the MTS. 
The analysis in this report has taken a limited view of “defensive investment,” but 
the model and technique can be extended to consider a comprehensive formulation in 
which one considers a list of possible investment options, ranging from hardening to 
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redundancy to capacity expansion, each with its own cost.  Then, given a fixed limited 
investment, the DAD model will identify the combination(s) of investment that yield the 
most resilient system.  Moreover, it then becomes possible to consider how different 
levels of investment lead to improved resilience.  Such defensive “return on investment” 
trade-offs will be an important avenue for future work. 
The specific DAD model in this report was designed so that it could be used to 
assess the operational resilience of transporting any commodities through any river port 
over a long time horizon.  The application of the model to a new port, however, will 
require considerable time to develop available raw data into a form suitable for use as 
model input.  In addition, we anticipate that it will take considerable effort to exercise the 
model to analyze the “what if” scenarios for disruptions.  The DAD model is not a 
software tool that can simply be “rolled out” on a regional or national basis. 
Thus, the development of DAD models for assessing the operational resilience of 
individual ports represents a nontrivial investment, but it is one that can provide benefits 
beyond the near term.  Because infrastructure tends to change on relatively slow time 
scales, we anticipate that, for example, the locks and dams in the Port of Pittsburgh will 
remain relatively unchanged over the next several years, or even decades.  This means 
that an operator’s model of port operations can be helpful not only with planning today, 
but also in the future, as emergent situations arise.  A key issue is how to manage the 
ongoing development, use, and custody of these models. 
At this moment and in the foreseeable future, the Coast Guard must rely on 
personnel at the Naval Postgraduate School to exercise DAD models using a combination 
of customized and commercial software.  We suggest that a natural, long-term objective 
should be to transition the software and analysis to Coast Guard personnel so they can 
use it independently.  The means by which the Coast Guard develops the capability and 
resources to receive decision support models, such as DAD, remains an important topic  
of conversation. 
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APPENDIX A. COAL SHIPMENT DATA 
 
week thru on off thru on off thru on off
1 71925 31358 40567 74507 2582 74507
2 214496 147612 66884 240947 26451 250599 9652
3 244869 107664 137205 257121 12252 259940 2819
4 211047 120649 90398 218575 7528 227024 8449
5 179949 117030 62919 198037 18088 214504 16467
6 190628 105060 85568 207219 16591 218505 11286
7 232285 103283 129002 246733 14448 251755 5022
8 249145 116176 132969 263132 13987 275014 11882
9 235023 130383 104640 244959 9936 247805 2846
10 191377 115128 76249 199551 8174 215611 16060
11 151953 112181 39772 161857 9904 178612 16755
12 145744 101563 44181 158775 13031 170412 11637
13 112519 69604 42915 121123 8604 126614 5491
14 208390 107304 101086 224442 16052 226790 2348
15 170943 79512 91431 190424 19481 203673 13249
16 175407 70058 105349 185137 9730 197184 12047
17 146250 50891 95359 167717 21467 175606 7889
18 144057 40796 103261 154082 10025 154082
19 157255 59856 97399 164723 7468 164723
20 118176 55671 62505 118176 129906 11730
21 145466 61252 84214 145466 148454 2988
22 211721 69461 142260 211721 214771 3050
23 219278 58545 160733 219278 220760 1482
24 174788 55068 119720 174788 183752 8964
25 213476 53758 159718 213476 229947 16471
26 186221 62105 124116 186221 190662 4441
27 195139 79398 115741 195139 202513 7374
28 183706 87531 96175 183706 191264 7558
29 158436 64003 94433 158436 166258 7822
30 135916 60556 75360 135916 135916
31 141171 78468 62703 141171 144093 2922
32 178789 97899 80890 178789 192508 13719
33 107217 72633 34584 107217 108811 1594
34 193211 100040 93171 193211 205746 12535
35 196712 73545 123167 196712 197721 1009
36 200046 71260 128786 200046 207269 7223
37 175228 87052 88176 183224 7996 183224
38 172079 77693 94386 183445 11366 198418 14973
39 162918 63106 99812 164629 1711 175751 11122
40 178367 73452 104915 178367 178367
41 177225 79239 97986 177225 177225
42 170842 65237 105605 170842 170842
43 143754 92685 51069 143754 160363 16609
44 134892 86280 48612 134892 139608 4716
45 162160 88072 74088 162160 162160
46 174583 95939 78644 174583 183066 8483
47 218587 94393 124194 218587 222904 4317
48 160981 69726 91255 160981 162031 1050
49 183817 97282 86535 183817 187906 4089
50 183513 76706 106807 183513 192079 8566
51 182621 74168 108453 182621 191969 9348
52 127114 73339 53775 127114 135422 8308
53 160401 75014 85387 160401 162168 1767
TOTAL 9261813 4356684 4905129 9528685 0 266872 9886814 358129 0
POOL 0 POOL 10 POOL 20
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week thru on off thru on off thru on off
1 98481 23974 120102 21621 120102
2 276182 25583 336807 57257 3368 336807
3 271650 11710 328832 50401 6781 328832
4 247530 20506 289077 40466 1081 289077
5 234928 20424 299526 55688 8910 299526
6 243229 24724 295965 47251 5485 295965
7 257977 6222 311949 46178 7794 311949
8 303714 28700 354902 43409 7779 354902
9 266842 19037 313481 45552 1087 313481
10 223381 7770 317521 94140 317521
11 178612 254578 75966 254578
12 170412 218039 47627 218039
13 126614 177360 43983 6763 177360
14 226790 258861 27624 4447 258861
15 204809 1136 228008 18561 4638 228008
16 213627 16443 251719 33772 4320 251719
17 187346 11740 228885 33824 7715 228885
18 170540 16458 223077 42639 9898 223077
19 173843 9120 207092 22331 10918 207092
20 166380 36474 202401 34934 1087 202401
21 184468 36014 240409 48325 7616 240409
22 238167 23396 285965 46732 1066 285965
23 228908 8148 265658 26531 10219 265658
24 195143 11391 240936 34857 10936 240936
25 249816 19869 299811 42316 7679 299811
26 202134 11472 265138 55490 7514 265138
27 236609 34096 278214 31629 9976 278214
28 201727 10463 248276 35849 10700 248276
29 170362 4104 183959 3800 9797 183959
30 165443 29527 167378 896 1039 167378
31 149311 5218 179598 30287 179598
32 209024 16516 234244 25220 234244
33 119175 10364 156751 37576 156751
34 205746 259039 46655 6638 259039
35 210321 12600 251092 38524 2247 251092
36 235793 28524 273477 29150 8534 273477
37 200262 17038 233788 31409 2117 233788
38 198418 238973 40555 238973
39 175751 196173 19371 1051 196173
40 178367 202105 15477 8261 202105
41 177225 203341 26116 203341
42 170842 187659 16817 187659
43 166579 6216 169429 2850 169429
44 139608 143597 2850 1139 143597
45 162160 176678 8796 5722 176678
46 183066 218806 26946 8794 218806
47 222904 249789 22424 4461 249789
48 162031 187553 25522 187553
49 187906 220724 32818 220724
50 192079 211303 12577 6647 211303
51 191969 221297 26013 3315 221297
52 135422 167017 25041 6554 167017
53 162168 179879 13331 4380 179879
TOTAL 10451791 0 564977 12456238 1765974 238473 12456238 0 0
POOL 30 POOL 40 POOL 50
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week thru on off thru on off thru on off
1 123337 6715 5641 5641 5641
2 341222 27175 22777 22777 22777
3 333513 24617 24118 24118 20946
4 298023 28860 18023 18023 18023
5 300831 25918 20000 20000 20000
6 307337 26595 14664 14664 14664
7 326231 29467 14891 14891 14891
8 364034 29164 18560 18560 18560
9 334378 33058 27295 27295 25759
10 323878 28640 33509 33509 33509
11 260367 31603 22351 22351 20844
12 218039 16472 24334 24334 24334
13 185222 15411 21733 21733 20178
14 273568 30447 29754 29754 28247
15 229060 19335 24848 24848 24848
16 251719 22984 32652 32652 31145
17 234466 18482 2015 2015 2015
18 236410 13333 20117 20117 20117
19 211324 18211 23483 23483 21988
20 203512 18657 13631 13631 13631
21 249552 23198 13030 13030 11471
22 293701 26971 8643 8643 8643
23 278387 22399 5648 5648 5648
24 246929 19996 9692 9692 9692
25 299811 21480 16886 16886 16886
26 275091 27720 21604 21604 20049
27 278214 19823 12703 12703 12703
28 254618 23743 16636 16636 15110
29 191352 15215 27776 27776 26114
30 175281 13729 23250 23250 23250
31 187203 16973 23012 23012 21505
32 235916 36604 24351 24351 22792
33 165347 15239 26127 26127 26127
34 262159 27291 35477 35477 35477
35 260697 18555 27567 27567 27567
36 284002 25339 31929 31929 28820
37 245438 22881 35994 35994 35994
38 238973 23476 22811 22811 22811
39 196173 16080 19263 19263 19263
40 214617 22339 19025 19025 17466
41 213070 27680 13635 13635 10566
42 196626 20742 2915 2915 2915
43 169429 25269 19193 19193 19193
44 143597 10016 14356 14356 14356
45 190451 19117 24217 24217 24217
46 222527 26160 28644 28644 25609
47 258506 25381 18178 18178 16623
48 194824 12968 25845 25845 25845
49 228742 28716 24211 24211 24211
50 211303 22619 25222 25222 25222
51 224501 18502 34364 34364 31041
52 173656 17772 26328 26328 26328
53 188460 19983 23515 23515 23515
TOTAL 12805624 0 1179120 1116443 0 0 1116443 0 1079146
POOL 60 POOL 70 POOL 80
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week thru on off thru on off thru on off
1 5641 5641 125498 1431 25262
2 18015 18015 351911 1517 96773
3 18510 18510 3172 329828 494 79241
4 12323 12323 294585 93105
5 15250 15250 286718 4053 80131
6 10708 10708 298866 2708 63928
7 11091 11091 318337 8200 71265
8 14760 14760 354962 8340 71193
9 22395 22395 1536 336640 5435 79258
10 27156 27156 322398 5412 65694
11 19818 19818 1507 251674 10870 71437
12 23384 23384 231660 14249 67021
13 16983 16983 1555 186796 9713 54744
14 25954 25954 1507 287398 3922 78307
15 21048 21048 248426 10759 69254
16 31702 31702 1507 276500 5226 56932
17 2015 2015 242548 6807 53166
18 17223 17223 260751 6504 41804
19 19683 19683 1495 210238 5016 33216
20 13631 13631 219487 56939
21 6351 6351 1559 251783 1594 55005
22 1993 1993 279788 56228
23 4698 4698 292152 64709
24 7790 7790 238814 1611 33484
25 13148 13148 307961 47199
26 14064 14064 1555 270831 1553 42257
27 2957 2957 251602 46268
28 1526 1526 1526 239286 76163
29 21288 21288 1662 214605 3185 65454
30 22320 22320 190845 42197
31 20091 20091 1507 202085 61870
32 17516 17516 1559 229206 1574 78902
33 19228 19228 180571 1708 60970
34 29777 29777 290122 4221 91048
35 21836 21836 277487 6723 62068
36 25279 25279 3109 281599 11499 52694
37 31244 31244 270538 12706 65717
38 17111 17111 246729 74548
39 15463 15463 191756 8126 52587
40 14275 14275 1559 211197 6551 50244
41 10785 10785 3069 196916 13809 49949
42 2915 2915 193154 6791 41455
43 16343 16343 166394 5574 75933
44 11506 11506 142237 5798 52316
45 23267 23267 209366 1338 57307
46 25794 25794 3035 237337 10062 72727
47 18178 18178 1555 276595 14562 76231
48 24176 24176 211634 47186
49 24211 24211 232255 61202
50 24220 24220 211902 3047 44938
51 29360 29360 1555 1768 226913 3275 41974
52 22412 22412 181019 48586
53 19529 19529 192601 3146 43326
TOTAL 907941 0 0 907941 35529 1768 13032501 239109 3201412
POOL 90 POOL 100 POOL 110
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week thru on off thru on off thru on off
1 103916 988 10824 101434 20170 106598 74847 31968
2 290342 1950 77614 241608 85453 229823 139740 83028
3 259786 25649 250416 56390 275332 198045 87041
4 219293 30965 202285 59987 1694 209109 144072 80593
5 207674 30021 190541 57965 1802 199726 117386 89435
6 238556 39724 269903 123772 1668 256823 124298 121116
7 239957 20088 276637 122708 1802 255424 135353 121046
8 280326 41730 301977 118643 307817 185467 120373
9 261803 49931 247007 100129 1735 207109 117094 76168
10 257428 47465 219933 66570 1882 165002 59687 62878
11 177746 9749 42195 131331 40903 126861 38759 73005
12 171844 10010 50056 177680 90959 173884 46656 88599
13 138167 28630 171550 93224 170219 49476 91813
14 217595 25683 234229 105589 214690 133502 66238
15 195021 2929 28052 216160 98565 217007 132636 87022
16 236407 1900 24254 252011 93823 256956 164943 98821
17 201543 992 7309 226020 84403 216952 126139 84855
18 222455 7060 248865 88453 245368 156045 95165
19 176974 10090 193014 75059 177042 114856 55489
20 184342 7469 228859 69771 257699 148138 87762
21 218706 14873 234232 68417 228159 138562 79139
22 239484 11236 249318 79596 230429 154265 73774
23 252806 11011 286507 110623 245013 165211 54790
24 204677 8063 221945 61773 221830 139063 64525
25 283101 12203 292118 81022 273029 171405 76217
26 250487 21232 266393 81272 266425 163344 97444
27 220231 27329 237623 58852 256647 171700 83564
28 183930 12335 179594 12239 222639 166126 83869
29 168866 18761 153406 31552 121854 114923
30 157835 15887 154995 50459 108396 93622 4903
31 160937 24599 157803 57207 125103 71979 35757
32 180296 23148 169161 57057 150063 104844 52885
33 133830 1926 16449 135981 55311 121968 61191 52293
34 230401 950 22920 259597 94409 1618 269301 152604 121299
35 227632 4754 19302 241491 85343 1713 233610 135222 102387
36 226420 1900 13980 234052 67332 4433 222992 163099 75018
37 212257 7668 22868 215262 43638 20985 232236 168574 89099
38 194229 24154 10728 194321 21109 30412 225713 166005 91899
39 132174 1522 6692 153961 26312 27887 150621 126809 38543
40 157760 10539 181204 43733 20913 195416 148605 68527
41 137604 12555 13050 129138 41179 123047 71789 46080
42 160001 5497 21074 173874 99396 137134 66015 78363
43 97737 19421 112857 84857 9869 76712 36731 48712
44 89487 1974 22052 102515 49446 14768 122566 72466 73047
45 155628 22358 19604 161637 85631 22033 148187 83947 86590
46 175908 7301 26034 185580 45680 22149 212395 140646 101173
47 210477 21792 228033 65423 22074 224575 164558 93087
48 165431 6328 200021 60797 18589 202174 125998 98324
49 178017 4161 13921 201032 41562 29846 239479 156802 125341
50 172989 1338 21150 192316 59243 20215 167434 122435 49739
51 192395 24114 232713 65144 27307 245343 162153 102841
52 137547 14014 163763 38499 25668 193922 123489 89654
53 154589 18478 196741 66062 25217 179304 117497 40536
TOTAL 10345044 126576 1169996 10880644 3642711 356279 10643157 6628818 4081834
POOL 120 POOL 130 POOL 140
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Table 5. Total flow of coal (in tons) that go on, off, and through a specific pool, by 
week, in Calendar Year 2009. 
  
week thru on off thru on off thru on off
1 20898 1053 27454 15564 19499
2 66418 8133 71302 31329 41241 11749 11749
3 55273 13990 63460 29052 56585
4 46952 10264 72860 48949 60083
5 54109 13489 73173 40648 65078
6 60129 9479 71827 34054 57845
7 47717 6859 85586 58829 70407
8 69053 11114 91879 47083 77659
9 50534 10979 81855 55405 68750
10 60431 12858 77398 30661 61656 6599 6599
11 53591 7860 79676 42885 62154 6521 6521
12 76522 14733 97681 48498 75362 6876 6876
13 76798 14629 79104 37631 51316 4932 4932
14 64567 8493 87434 37562 74996 2348 2348
15 52952 9645 79329 46294 63173 3780 3780
16 55493 12752 69190 33168 59218
17 52296 11489 63844 31387 51713
18 46601 3879 68544 36107 57302
19 44622 4645 50270 20602 39961
20 70328 2807 80577 27553 66080
21 46193 4795 63918 35238 51200
22 47972 4708 66674 37923 52161
23 55105 966 87645 47725 73426
24 55527 4866 72443 32915 61310
25 68239 7116 77792 41812 52649
26 63176 5170 77123 36557 59683
27 49435 4014 52876 28432 31899
28 22031 7972 23034 20883 11126
29 6931 1065 6850 6850 984
30 9871 4102 13947 9191 12934
31 31037 1104 52495 30104 44953
32 29187 3254 44898 35237 28626
33 35655 2916 65169 39385 58214
34 55554 4296 74334 40581 56829
35 46562 3892 75350 64312 43718
36 31082 3900 31133 21370 13714
37 32924 4988 30020 24470 7634
38 17975 1981 15994 14575 1419
39 7258 7258 7258
40 26517 979 25538 19193 6345
41 27573 2824 25702 10693 15962
42 24673 2009 30926 23790 15398
43 19418 1868 21460 19939 5431
44 29628 5830 25748 17322 10376
45 26858 1906 24952 20791 4161
46 23198 3699 20465 20465 966
47 16611 20742 20742 4131
48 19456 1984 18629 16619 2184 983 983
49 33058 2802 30256 29224 1032 1032
50 17093 935 16158 10225 1834 4099 4099
51 31729 4123 33565 24561 12994 1969 1969
52 39989 6749 43562 30405 23479
53 42943 48442 18973 34968
TOTAL 2215742 295963 0 2797541 1611021 1980786 50888 8083 42805
POOL 150 POOL 160 POOL170
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APPENDIX B. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
A. THE OPERATOR’S MODEL 
Here we repeat the operator’s model for coal movement in the Port of Pittsburgh, 
first presented in Onuska (2012), in NPS standard form. 
Index Sets [~cardinality]: 
     nodes [~100] 
    transshipment nodes (alias i, j) 
   terminal nodes (alias o,s)  
   modes of transport; M={river, rail, road, transfer} 
\ ' transfer 'mx MX M∈ =  
{ , , }m i j A M N N∈ ⊆ × ×       directed arcs (from node i to node j using mode m) [~500] 
{ , , } |{ , , } { , , }m i j U m i j A m j i A∈ ∈ ∨ ∈  undirected arcs [~250] 
w W∈    time periods (alias wd) [weeks, ~50] 
{ , } _w wd FORE LOG∈  time periods w during which shipments can be made for 
contracts due in time period wd ( w wd≤ )[~50] 
{ , , , } _m i j w ARC I∈  if arc { , , }m i j  is damaged, it is still inoperable during time 
period  w [~500]  
c C∈     cargo type [~2] 
{ , , }c d wd COM∈   contract commodity [~1,000] 
Input Data [units]: 
, , ,o c d wdcontract  amount of cargo type c originating at node o contracted for 
delivery to node d during time period wd [tons] 
, ,m i jcost   cost per unit flow for using arc { , , }m i j A∈  [cost] 
, , ,o c d wdcpen  per-unit penalty for failing to deliver contract volume [cost/ton] 
shcost    holding cost for inventory at terminal s [cost/ton] 
_ sinv cap  inventory capacity at terminal s [tons] 
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,s cspen  per-unit demand shortfall penalty at node s of cargo type c 
[cost/ton] 
, ,m i jATTACK   binary indicator as to whether arc { , , }m i j A∈  is damaged; 
   = 1 if arc { , , }m i j is damaged, = 0 otherwise [binary] 
, ,m i jq    per unit flow penalty for using arc { , , }m i j A∈  if damaged [cost] 
, ,m i jcap   directed capacity of arc { , , }m i j A∈  [tons]  
, ,m i jucap  undirected (shared) capacity of arcs { , , }m i j A∈  and { , , }m j i A∈ ,  
i < j [tons] 
Computed Data: 
, ,c d wddemand  demand for cargo type c at node d at during time period wd [tons] 




= ∑  
Nonnegative Decision Variables [units]: 
, , , ,o w c d wdF  flow from mine o during time period w of contract cargo {c,d,wd} 
[tons] 
, , , , . ,m i j w c d wdY  flow along arc { , , }m i j A∈  during time period w of contract cargo 
{c,d,wd} [tons] 
, , , ,s w c d wdIN  inventory at node s at start of time period w of contract cargo 
{c,d,wd} [tons] 
, , , ,s w c d wdA  transfer node s shortage at start of time period w of contract cargo 
{c,d,wd} [tons] 
, , , ,s w c d wdR  transfer node s excess at start of time period w of contract cargo 
{c,d,wd} [tons] 
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Formulation 1:  Defender Model (D) 
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 The objective (S0) measures the total transit, transfer and inventory holding cost, 
plus any penalties for shortfalls or contract violations.  The “attack” terms will be 
discussed in a following section, but here merely represent arcs whose costs have risen so 
dramatically that they will not be used.  Each constraint (S1) ensures for some contract 
that total flows from the source mine meet the contract amount.  Note that in case of 
anticipated disruptions, flows may leave the mine earlier than the delivery contract week 
to be stored in intermediate inventory somewhere and conveyed to the customer later.  
Each constraint (S2) accounts for balance of flow at some transfer node at the start of a 
planning period for some commodity.  Each constraint (S3) accounts for intermodal 
transfers at some terminal node of come commodity, including inventory, shortfall, 
supply, and demand.  Constraints (S4) and (S5) enforce directed and undirected capacity 
on arcs, respectively.  Each constraint (S6) limits inventory held at some terminal at the 
start of some planning period. 
 This model finds the minimum-cost means of delivering the contracted amount 
from each source to each destination, using any of three modes of transport, each having 
its own costs and capacities.  An interdiction on an arc increases its usage cost, so if there 
is a disruption in one system (e.g., river), then the model looks for a low-cost alternative 
route (e.g., river, rail, or road).  There is a penalty (cpencod) for violating delivery of 
contracted amounts (e.g., by satisfying a customer from an alternative supplier), but, in 
general, this penalty is less than the penalty for incurring a customer shortfall (spensc). 
The model has the flexibility to move and store coal in advance of its contract 
delivery date.  This is advantageous when planning for scheduled maintenance or when 
buffering inventories to reduce the impact of unplanned disruptions.  This functionality is 
controlled by the FORE_LOG mechanism in the formulation, which maintains an aspect 
of realism in delivery planning by limiting the model’s forecasting ability.  A reasonable 
use of this mechanism might be to allow the model to plan ahead and move coal up to 
four weeks in advance.  This prevents the model from transporting all coal in the first 
week of operations, limited only by infrastructure capacity.  This unrestricted movement 
of coal is inconsistent with industry practice, which is more similar to a just-in-time 
system. 
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B. THE ATTACKER’S MODEL 
Repeating the presentation in Onuska (2012), the attacker’s model follows 
directly from the operator’s model formulation, by replacing the input data 
with a decision variable Xmij. 
Additional Data 
num_attacks  Number of allowable attacks 
 
Additional Variables 
Xmij   Disrupt Flow on arc (m,i,j), 
   binary indicator as to whether arc ( , , )m i j A∈  is damaged; 
   = 1 if arc (m,i,j) is damaged, 
   = 0 otherwise 
 
Formulation 2:  Attacker-Defender Model (AD) 
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The objective function (A0) replaces (S0) and now takes a bi-level max-min form, 
with decision variables Xmij replacing data .  Operating constraints (S1)-(S5) 
apply as before.  Constraints (A6) make sure that any attack on a directed arc also affects 
its reverse arc.  Constraints (A7) enforce the attacker’s “budget.”  Constraints (A8) 
enforce the binary nature of attacks. 
We implement the Attacker’s Model using the General Algebraic Modeling 
System (GAMS 2012), and solve it with Bender’s Decomposition (see Wood 2011 for 
details on the use of this technique to solve bi-level network interdiction problems) using 
the CPLEX Optimization Solver (International Business Machines 2012). 
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